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From the Editors
Our editorial group has been calling this issue the “Harvard issue,” since 
we decided to group together a range of articles focusing on Harvard Law 
School, the school most associated with hierarchy in legal education, the 
case method, and in particular the case method as a “paper chase” involving 
cutthroat competition and high student anxiety. The first two articles, by 
Professor Bruce Kimball, take us into the history of Harvard Law School in 
the decades prior to World War I. Both make the case for the importance 
of this neglected period in the history of Harvard Law School and contain 
lessons for today’s law school deans.
The first article is on Harvard’s “impoverishment,” which resulted from the 
school’s early dependence on expanding student enrollments, the prosperity 
associated with that approach, and the problems that soon emerged from self-
funding construction projects. The article asks why the Harvard Law School, 
under Dean James Barr Ames, rejected the formula of President Charles 
Eliot so familiar to academics today–spend all the revenues, plead poverty to 
alumni, get them to endow professorships and chairs, in particular, since such 
endowments can free up resources for the dean or president to spend as he or 
she chooses, and in general claim urgent needs to compete with other schools 
even as the contributions grow. Compared with Harvard’s other professional 
schools at the time, the law school was slow to adapt the more general Harvard 
model.
The second article uses biographies, diaries, letters, and contemporary 
accounts to explore student life at Harvard Law School. These sources 
allow Professor Kimball to document the deliberate imposition of the 
hypercompetitive “paper chase” model at Harvard, which occurred well after 
the triumph of the case method. Harvard Law School, it turns out, was more 
student-friendly and less competitive under Dean Christopher Langdell than 
what became associated later with the Langdellian model of teaching. Under 
Dean Ezra Thayer in particular, Harvard Law School purged the institution of 
the people and activities that dampened potential competition among those 
vying for the law review and the rewards of academic distinction. It was not 
so much that the Langdellian recipes were meant to be student friendly, but 
the potentially harsh logical logic was mitigated under Langdell. It was only 
after Dean Thayer committed the school to full implementation that the path 
to generations of unhappy students was set.
Dean Kevin Washburn picks up the narrative several decades later. Based 
on his year as a visiting professor at Harvard in 2007-08, Washburn seeks to 
explain how the activities that took place under Dean Elena Kagan turned the 
typical student there from unhappy and alienated to engaged and enthusiastic. 
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He writes therefore of “the Miracle at Harvard.” From smaller sections to 
organized groups to food and volleyball, a series of small changes transformed 
the atmosphere. The stories are of internal developments at Harvard, but 
it appears also that the turn toward rigor before World War I and the turn 
toward warmth at the end of the 20th century were both also responses to 
competition from other elite law schools. The terms of that competition are 
clearly very different today.
The next article, by Daniel Martin Katz, Joshua R. Gubler, Jon Zelner, 
Michael Bommarito II, Eric Provins, and Eitan Ingall, then provides a 
complex but very provocative empirical analysis of the law professoriate and 
the “reproduction of hierarchy.” They show convincingly what law professors 
know – the complete dominance of a few law schools, led by Harvard with 
its elite stature and relatively large size, in the production of law professors. 
The authors make an important point that they hypothesize is a result of the 
domination of the market for professors namely, that .this phenomenon is 
not simply about law school hiring but is also an indicator of a tilted market 
for the production of legal knowledge and legal doctrine. They suggest that 
understanding of how law school hierarchy works, in short, helps us see 
which ideas are taken seriously and diffused successfully into courts and legal 
theories.
In contrast to the previous articles, which show how entrenched the 
traditional hierarchy of law school prestige is, the article by Professor Dena 
Davis nicely shows how the relatively prestigious status of Fulbright scholar 
is well within reach of virtually any law professor willing to do the work and 
go abroad. It is a “how to” that is bound to be of interest to law professors 
everywhere in an age of globalization.
The last article, by Professor D.A. Jeremy Telman, acknowledges the 
enduring influence of Langdell and the case method, but Telman finds a 
way to both lighten the burden of that method and help students master it. 
He composes limericks and uses them in part to teach contracts. Contracts 
professors may lack the temerity to bring these limericks into their own classes, 
but those who are immersed in the law of contracts will come away with a new 
sense of both the possibilities of humor in contracts and what leading cases 
might be construed to say.
Our two book reviews are very different but highly instructive. Professor 
Christopher Tomlins takes up the question of the consumption of history 
in the legal academy, drawing on four works of historical synthesis to see 
what indeed they might offer to legal historians. His review suggests that 
the dichotomy of more general historians, who produce history as “science,” 
versus legal historians and others in law schools, who consume the grand 
syntheses and import them into their work, will not suffice. The general 
historians themselves, he finds, build arguments that are based on their own 
current positions and their own encounter with the past. Of course, not all 
historical syntheses are equal, and historians make distinctions among their 
colleagues in part based on the quality of their research and the cogency of 
3their presentations. But the point is that legal historians have to do their own 
work. From their own position and perspective, they must fully dive into the 
historical material and create original works of legal history. Consuming and 
perhaps refocusing historical syntheses will not be enough.
Finally, Joseph Mandel, from the perspective of his experience managing 
the legal affairs of the UCLA campus for sixteen years, assesses “the trials of 
academe.” He notes that, as the title of Amy Gajda’s book suggests, it may be 
that courts should be better educated on academic values and the dangers of 
intervening in academic decisions. At the same time, Mandell also observes 
that there are instances where, in fact, those in the academy hide discrimination 
and other wrongs behind so-called academic values making campus litigation 
necessary at times.
The reviews round out what is an unusual issue of the Journal of Legal 
Education. It may be a reflection of academic hierarchy, but we think readers 
will be intrigued by the various perspectives on Harvard, Langdell, and the 
case method, that make up the bulk of this issue. As always, we welcome 
comments and suggestions.
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